Need for Economic Intelligence by Jan Leijonhielm
119
Need for Economic Intelligence* 
Jan Leijonhielm
FOA, Stockholm, Sweden
1. Intelligence estimates of changes in Europe at the end of the
20th century
National Intelligence services largely failed to foresee the great
changes in Europe in the ´80s and ´90s, at least in the sense that
they conveyed them to partners and/or convinced their govern-
ments to act upon them. In some cases, as in the matter of the
Baltic states’ independence struggle, the KGB was accurate in its
warnings, but failed to convince the leadership to act upon this
Intelligence.
Do these Intelligence failures exhibit similar characteristics
over an extended time period? To a large extent, I believe they do.
My arguments for this hypothesis are:
Systematic errors .Intelligence systems tend to pay attention to signals that sup-
port current expectations regarding the behavior of other
nations or actors. This often leads to ”group think”. It is also
a fact that defensive is more common than offensive irra-
tionality..There is usually adequate documentation, even in the case of
unexpected developments,  in the materials gathered by
Intelligence services. The fault is generally not in the collection
of Intelligence, but in the analysis, and incorrect analysis leads
to inaccurate targeting of new Intelligence areas.
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.Intelligence organizations are seldom equipped with ”devil’s
advocates”, who are free to say: ”But what if…”.Cognitive rigidity, plus anxiety over deviating analyses in the
Intelligence services, create an obstacle to pluralism..Analyses prepared by both academics and professional
Intelligence officers has proved to be the best system, but this
mix rarely exists in reality. 
Human-related factors.The main reason that serious misinterpretations of events occur
is due to the aura of secretiveness and mystery in the
Intelligence world.  Secrets - for example the operational
capacity of a military body, new weapons, or military R&D
progress - can be obtained. But what is in the human mind,
what  a dictator´s ultimate intention is, or how he will react,
is almost impossible to gauge unless one is able to utilize
human Intelligence (HUMINT) at a very close range to the
leader in question. Even so, there is always room for uncer-
tainty. It was impossible, for instance, for anyone to have
claimed  knowledge about Saddam Hussein´s attack on
Kuwait, or Yeltsin´s move to dissolve the Soviet Union in
Belovezha in 1991.  Even the acting Belorussian president
Shushkevitj, by his own admission, had not been informed of
the ultimate purpose of the meeting..The greater his influence, the more difficult it is to predict a
sovereign’s actions..Another cause of Intelligence failures due to human-related
factors is the relationship between Intelligence services and
politicians.2 Politicians are often unwilling to make costly
decisions which could accelerate an ongoing conflict or harm
the politician. The personal chemistry between the messenger
and the politician has therefore played an important role.
Generally, decisionmakers’ inability to react is more common
than the Intelligence services’ inability to warn.
2. The role of Intelligence in conflict resolution.3
The political and military elements involved in peacekeeping
require Intelligence in order to ensure the safety and success of the
operation. UN peacekeeping forces have often lacked that capac-
ity.  The UN´s own Intelligence, termed ”information” for psycho-
logical reasons, must often be substituted by the participants’
national Intelligence. Intelligence requirements vary, from data on
possible attacks in peace enforcement operations, to HUMINT-120
related Intelligence regarding the state of mind in a specific, small
area, which could indicate an outbreak of violence in low-level
conflicts. A whole range of specific Intelligence requirements is
therefore needed. These more complex type of requirements have
emerged in the post Cold-war era. At the same time, more atten-
tion must be paid to political consequences at home, to the
media, and to the organization in question.
The Intelligence service of a peacekeeping operation is usu-
ally more fragmentary than ordinary Intelligence, which makes it
difficult to obtain a clear picture. The connection between strate-
gic and tactical levels is very strong. When processing Intelligence
from a peacekeeping operation, it is  seldom possible to use tra-
ditional criteria utilized in ”ordinary” wars. The multinational ele-
ments place new demands on the Intelligence process as well.
Ways to promote effectivness and resolve these difficulties are:.Whenever possible, cooperate on strategy, terminology, etc., in
advance of an operation conducted under UN auspices. .Use national Intelligence sources in the field to ensure a com-
mon approach, and move gradually to joint efforts..During an operation, create two to three scenarios, based on
the political-strategic situation, but adapted to tactical levels.
New tactical Intelligence can be used to better evaluate the
strategic situation. 
3. Subjects and methods of Intelligence agencies at the beginning
of the 21st century: possibilities and limits.
Intelligence has been increasingly privatized during the past
decade. The number of large and medium-sized corporations,
banks, financial institutes, political and economic, academic and
non-academic think tanks dealing in Intelligence, has grown at an
astonishing speed. The need for and volume of economic
Intelligence has grown at the same pace. According to the CIA,
40 per cent of its collection and analysis in the mid 1990s con-
cerned economic matters4.   Since the Primakov era, its Russian
counterpart has also placed a high priority on economic
Intelligence, and the same trend is evident in most Intelligence
agencies, especially in Germany, Japan and France. Large com-
panies often invest more capital and human effort in Intelligence
than small nations.
The reasons for this development are obvious: most nations,
especially small ones, are vulnerable to external pressure and
rapid changes in the world. Economic sanctions, financial insta-
bility, flow of raw materials, speculation on the local currency, and

























tial dangers. Even unintentional economic misconduct by a large
neighbouring nation, resulting, for example, in lost market shares,
could become a serious danger.  By the same token, companies
and other economic factors are under pressure to interpret and
evaluate their environment. 
The link between economy and security has therefore become
stronger. This can be exemplified in several ways:  prosperous
nations today are more inclined to be peaceful, since prosperity is
tied to economic interdependence, and is too valuable to risk. A
good economic performance thus creates stability, and enhances
the survival of democracies, the most obvious example being
North and South Korea.
Economy will continue to influence security policy in the
future. It will be much safer and more effective for developed
nations to use economic instruments to achieve security policy
goals, and this will also place more demands on economic
Intelligence.
Economic security has not often been addressed in the west-
ern media, though the debate has been quite strong in Russia.
There are several reasons for this.  The most important is that eco-
nomic security can be interpreted differently depending on the
level of society:  in terms of personal security, which was severely
damaged during the transition period, security of supplies and
provisions, which is often in danger in some parts of Russia, the
nation´s security and economic survival, and, finally, its role on
the world. 
Economic Intelligence will become more internationalized
and transparent in the future. The necessity for speedy reaction
will increase as economic threats and situations which require a
quick response appear without warning. As a result of this, nation-
al, traditional Intelligence may become less useful and effective,
except in military matters. These new, rapidly changing threat
dimensions do not allow as much time as before for thorough
analysis and decision-making.  As Francesco Cossiga5 has point-
ed out, the mix of private and governmental actors, and the ques-
tion of offensive and defensive Intelligence, present another prob-
lem. In the future, not only the threats, but also the actors, will
become more indefinable. Economic, political, or military targets
in an information warfare attack will be more indistinguishable,
easier to disguise, and harder to oppose. The Russian threat, as
expressed in its 1993 Military  Doctrine, to use any kind of retali-
ation, including nuclear arms, in response to a massive IW attack
demonstrates the potential future dangers. A clever hacker with
sufficient computer power could quickly close down a small coun-
try economically, and severely damage sectors of society in a larg-
er one. A Swedish hacker recently succeeded in paralyzing a


























We cannot escape new and increasing threats to society, and
we are bound to become more dependent on high-tech solutions.
What we can do is use Intelligence to better understand the nature
of these threats, and build scenarios to predict them and to pre-
vent hasty and unpremeditated counteraction.
NOTES
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